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THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD-THE ILLINOIS
ADOPTION ACT IN PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
Effective October 1, 1973, the Illinois Adoption Act' was amended
by the addition of section 9.1-20a:
The best interests and welfare of the person to be adopted shall be of
paramount consideration in the construction and interpretation of this
Act.
The Adoption Act does not otherwise attempt to clarify this section, nor
does it explain how section 9.1-20a functions within a procedural context.
Given this apparent statement of policy, this Comment will discuss how
this concern for the adoptive child evolved, and consider to what extent
the best interests of the child can be served in Illinois.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
According to Sir Henry Maine, adoption is one of the oldest and most
widely employed legal fictions.2 Adoption affects the biological parents,
the adoptive parents, the person adopted, and the community. Through
the years, adoption has served varied purposes. Ancient adoption law,
particularly Roman law, was clearly designed to benefit the adoptor.8
Maintaining the continuity of the adoptor's family was the primary purpose
of adoption. 4 Adoption under Roman law was an institution "whereby
the great families provided themselves with heirs to their property and
worship, successors to office or a political following." 5  References to
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1 et seq. (1973). All references to sections
hereafter shall be to the above Act unless otherwise indicated.
2. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 130 (15th ed. 1894).
3. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J.
FAM. L. 443, 446 (1971); Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9
VAND. L. REV. 743, 745 (1956).
4. Huard, supra note 3, at 745. In his historical reconstruction Sir Henry Maine
surmised that without adoption, primitive tribes could not have absorbed each other
or combined except on terms of "absolute superiority on one side and absolute subjec-
tion on the other." MAINE, supra note 2, at 131.
5. Goody, Adoption in Cross-cultural Perspective, 11 COMP. STUD. Soc. & HIST.
55, 60 (1969). For a general discussion, see J. GOODY, DEATH, PROPERTY AND THE
ANCESTORS ch. 18 (1962).
Before a Roman adoption could occur, three prerequisites had to be met. The first
condition was that the adoption had to "imitate nature." Brosnan, The Law of Adop-
tion, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1922). This requirement meant that a eunuch could
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adoption are found in the earliest known codes of law. As early as 2285
B.C., the Code of Hammurabi spoke of adoption as it existed among the
Babylonians. 6 The biblical account of the finding of Moses by the
Pharaoh's daughter gives credence to the fact -that adoption was known
to both Egyptians and the Hebrews. 7  In Greece, adoption arose when
a man had no offspring or no male offspring.8 The adoptee's relationship
with his own kin was immediately severed upon adoption,9 and the
not adopt, but an impotent person could, since impotence might be cured. The first
condition accounted for the second: an adopted child! could not be older than his
father. Justinian declared that a man had to be eighteen years older than the son
he desired to adopt. The final requirement was that only a man could adopt. After
291 A.D. women were allotted a limited form of adoption to help ease their
loss of children taken from them.
There were two types of adoption permitted by Roman law: adoption and adroga-
tion. Id. Adoption in the strict sense was the legal act whereby a lberson who was
under the power of the natural head of his family passed out of such pater familias
to fall under the paternal power of a new family head. The adoptee became a
stranger to his natal agnatic family. This was accomplished, initially, when a son
was fictitiously sold three times by his father, and his daughter or granddaughter sold
once. See ADAM, ROMAN ANTIQUITIES (1833). Justinian simplified this procedure,
enabling adoption to be effective by a simple proceeding before a magistrate wherein
the adoptor, adoptee, and the natural parent appeared. Appeal of Woodward, 81
Conn. 152, 70 A. 453 (1908).
Adrogation meant the adoption of a person, generally an adult, who was sui generis
and independent. The person adrogated renounced the worship of the gods of his
previous family and worshipped the gods of his new family. W. BUCKLAND, A TExT-
BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 123 (1927). Adrogation was more ancient in form than adop-
tion, and adrogation required the enactment of a specific law by the Cornitia Curiata.
Huard, supra note 3, at 745, citing I. COLQUHUON, A SUMMARY OF THE ROMAN CIVIL
LAw 688 (1849).
Thus, either by adoption in the strict sense, or by adrogation, the adopted child's
relations with his biological family were severed and the adopted child submitted him-
self to his new father's patria potestas. However, according to Justinian, the adopted
child usually retained his right to the succession of his natural father. Note, The
Effect of the Law of Adoption Upon Rights of Inheritance, 1 So. L. REV. 70, 76
(1875).
Patria potestas, in its original form, was a complete power over the offspring and
descendants, including the power of life and death. In Appeal of Woodward, supra
at 163, 70 A. at 457, this aspect of the Roman law had a strong effect on some Amer-
ican judges, who were repelled by the Roman parental power since "[w]ith us every
man who has reached his majority is free from [anyone else's] power."
6. Huard, supra note 3, at 743-45, citing 1 A. KOCOUREK & J. WIGMORE, Evo-
LUTION OF LAw: SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIMITIVE LAw 426 (1915).
7. "And she adopted him for a son and called him Moses, saying I took him
out of water!" Exodus 2:10. See also Esther 2:5-8, where Mordecai adopts his
niece, Esther.
8. Goody, supra note 5, at 61. Adoption could also arise when a man with no
sons wanted to prevent a close kinsman from claiming his daughter as an heiress.
Adoptions could be either inter vivos or by will, and usually involved close kin. If
an individual had a legitimate son of his own, he could not adopt another.
9. Id. Goody expounds that if adoption was during a man's lifetime, his
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adoptee "could be more easily repudiated than a 'natural' son."' 0
The ancient inhabitants of what is now Germany incorporated military
ceremonies in their practice of adoption, whereby a warlike weapon was
placed in the hands of the adopted individual." Adoption was also a prev-
alent custom of many American Indian tribes.' 2  However, the settlers'
courts prohibited their tribal customs since adoption was considered a
purely statutory matter, accomplished by power of law and not by act of
the parties.13 Hence, adoption as practiced by the American Indians was
cut short, since the courts of the white settlers would not sanction a
custom that did not conform to their statutory requirements.
The chief object of adoption under the Hindu law was the "perpetu-
ation of 'the lineage.' 4 The requirements for adoption emphasized concern
for class and the biological family rather than for the child adopted. The
adoptor could not already have a son, nor could the adoptor adopt a boy
of another class. 15 An only son could not be adopted, and the consent
of a kinsman of the adoptee was required. The adopted son was to be
a close consanguine to the adoptor, preferably a brother's son.' 6 The ac-
tual adoption involved a specific ceremony which emphasized the giving
and receiving of the child.' 7 As a result of -the act, the adopted son re-
ceived new rights of inheritance and the concomitant obligations, but still
retained a minimal link with his natural family, as shown by the fact that
he was prohibited from marrying within the family.' 8
Thus, it can be seen that adoption was utilized by numerous archaic
societies' 9 -to prolong the continuity of family existence.2 0 The "best inter-
adopted son was presented to the phrateres and the denesmen. If adoption occurred
posthumously, court action was required to establish the claim.
10. Id. at 62.
11. Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1922). See also,
Succession of Unforsake, 48 La. Ann. 546, 19 So. 602 (1896).
12. Brosnan, supra note 11, at 334; Huard, supra note 3, at 748; Presser, supra
note 3, at 489.
13. Non-she-po v. Wa-nin-ta, 37 Ore. 213, 62 P. 15 (1900), stated: "It never
was in the power of an individual, either by the common law of England or the
Roman law, to adopt the child of another at his volition, or by the consent of the
parents." See Henry v. Taylor, 16 S.D. 424, 93 N.W. 641 (1903).
14. MAYNE, A TREATISE ON HINDU LAW AND USAGE 133 (9th ed. 1922).
15. Goody, supra note 5, at 63.
16. id. at 63-64.
17. MAYNE, supra note 14, at 202. The adoptor would ask the natural father:
"Give me thy son," and the other answers: "I give him." He receives him with these
words: "I take thee to continue the line of my ancestors."
18. Id. at 179.
19. MAINE, supra note 2.
20. Huard, supra note 3, citing 2 A. KocouREK & J. WMomRE, EvOLUTION OF
LAw: PRIMITIVE AND ANCIENT LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 341 (1915).
[Vol. 24: 100
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ests of the child" seemed irrelevant during these 'times since it was the
interest of the adoptor rather than the adoptee ,that was the focal point
of adoption.
The term "best interest of the child" was never referred to in the En-
glish common law. In fact, adoption never achieved formal legal recogni-
tion. As was seen with the ancient practice of adoption, the adoptee be-
came a member of the adoptor's family, acquired a quasi-interest in the
adoptor's property during the adoptor's life, and succeeded to such pro-
perty when the adoptor died.21 Yet, to the English, due to their high re-
gard for blood lineage, adoption never gained support since heirs were per-
ceived only as legitimate children who were heirs of the blood. 22  Glanvill
emphasized this belief when he stated: "Only God can make a heres, not
Man.",23
In the Middle Ages, the property-owning classes in England did not
want an outsider made a part of the family since this would work to .the
prejudice of the expected heirs. 2 4 Because of this unwillingness to accept
21. Id. at 745.
22. id.
23. Glanvill, vii, 1., quoted in 2 F. PoLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 254 (2d ed. 1898). But see Presser, supra note 3, at 499. "Glanvill's
rule also may have had more to do with expressing a sentiment against testamen-
tary bequests and inter vivos gifts to nonrelated persons than it did with adoption."
24. Id. The dispute over the mantle-children was one possible reason for the
court's resistance to an adoption law. An ancient custom, later incorporated into the
English common law, provided for the legitimization of children born out of wedlock
to parents who subsequently married. Id. at 450. This custom was utilized in Ger-
many, France, and Normandy whereby the children, along with their father and
mother stood under a cloth extended while the marriage was solemnized. The child-
ren were called "mantle-children." POLLACK & MArrTLAND, supra note 23, at 399. Af-
ter a controversy involving whether the common law would adopt the canon law rule
allowing legitimization, the Statute of Merton, 20 Henry I1 1235 A.D., expressly re-jected this canon law rule. Presser, supra note 3, at 451.
The rationale most commentators offered for the Statute of Merton's refusal to rec-
ognize the mantle-children is that the rule was introduced by a foreigner. T. BAR-
RINGTON, OBSERVATxON OF ANCIENT STATUTES 44, 45 (1796), discussed in Joachim-
sen, The Statute to Legalize the Adoption of Minor Children, 8 ALBANY L.J. 353,
355 (1873).
Maitland suggests another reason for the unwillingness to accept adopted heirs:
from the days of the Conquest, legitimate children inherited fiefs held by military
service. POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra note 23, at 314-16. However, this contention
has been challenged on the basis that, from the Conquest until after 1200, the mili-
tary fief was not inheritable. Thorne, English Feudalism and Estates in Land, 1959
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 193. Instead, the Lord over the land, to whom the military service
was owed, could freely award the land to whomever he desired when the tenant for
service died. Id. Professor Thorne relates that a new tenant was chosen on the basis
of who could provide the best military service that was desired. Yet, due to conven-
ience and expectancy factors, the land would pass to the children of the former ten.
ants.
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adopted heirs, the English courts in the thirteenth century were reluctant
to establish adoption law.
Despite the absence of common law adoption, foster parenthood as
well as other mechanisms for the care of both dependent and independent
children were available. These alternatives made adoption, from a social
welfare standpoint, unnecessary. 25 In the case of foster parenthood, En-
glish families accepted and treated foster children as if they were natural
children, 20 except that they had no legal recognition and thus could not
inherit from the foster parents.
The two mechanisms which reached their zenith by the seventeenth
century27 and had as -their purpose the temporary training of the child 28
were the institutions of "putting out" and "apprenticeship. '29 During the
sixteenth century in England, nearly all young people in service would
change jobs by going to a new family for an extended period of time. This
"putting out" system applied -to both rich and poor alike, although, in most
instances, the children of the poor were passed on to the rich. 0 Moreover,
under the "putting out" system, when the child was sent to another house,
he had to learn 'the "manner (or the -trade) of the head of the family."'' l
The practice of "apprenticeship" was similar to ,that of "putting out"
and received the same acceptance in the seventeeth century.A2  This prac-
Presser explains that, if the Lord could freely award the land to whomever he de-
sired, upon the death of the tenant for service, then the only heirs who could receive
property were heirs by adoption, although it was the Lord who was doing the adopt-
ing and not the tenant who was succeeded. Moreover, if the Lords made arbitrary
choices which were resented by a sufficient number of the landless offspring of the
former tenants, "perhaps this resentment eventually resulted in a reluctance on the
part of the common law judges to recognize 'adopted' heirs of the tenant himself."
Presser, supra note 3, at 452.
25. These child care mechanisms are pertinent in connection with the purpose of
American adoption statutes. The purpose of American adoption statutes enacted in
the mid-nineteenth century was to provide for the best interests of the child, but this
need was satisfied in England by these child care mechanisms. Hence a statute on
adoption was not incorporated into the common law. See Presser, supra note 3, at
453.
26. Huard, supra note 3 at 746.
27. See generally P. LASLETr, THE WORLD WE HAVE LOST 1-3, 53-80 (1965).
28. Id. at 3.
Apprentices . . . were workers who were also children, extra sons or extra
daughters (for girls could be apprentices too), clothed and educated as well
as fed, obliged to obedience and forbidden to marry, unpaid and absolutely
dependent until the age of twenty-one.
29. Id. at 69-70.
30. AsES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD 290-91 (Baldick transl. 1962).
31. See text accompanying notes 40-64 inlra.
32. ARIES, supra note 30, at 371.
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tice presently continues among members of English working class.88  The
institutions of "apprenticeship" and "putting out" children served as the
basis for resolving the problem of dependent children, a problem which
became the prime concern of American adoption statutes.34
Adoption laws in the United States evolved from the increasing con-
cern for the welfare of neglected aand dependent children.8 5 ,Instead of
emphasizing the continuity of the adoptor's family, American adoption
laws stressed the welfare of the child. As a result, the "best interest of
the child" formula became a unique American contribution to the law of
adoption.86
Since our jurisprudence was largely acquired from England, "the ab-
sence of a common-law precedent undoubtedly inhibited the initiation of
the practice of adoption in this country. ' 37 Colonial America continued
the English institutions of "apprenticeship" and "putting out."38 Not only
did the parent voluntarily engage in the practice of "putting out," but the
state often encouraged this custom. 3 9  For example, when children became
"rude, stubborn, and unruly," according to the laws of the Massachusetts
Colony of 1648, the state could take them from their parents and place
them in another's home. 40 The procedure for "putting out" a child often
appeared in the will of the parent, whereby the parent provided for adop-
tion by a relative. Even in the absence of a will, orphans were placed
in relatives' homes.41 In either case, religion acted as an essential factor
33. Id.
34. Kuhlman, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASH.
U.L.Q. 221, 223-24 (1943).
35. Huard, supra note 3, at 749.
36. J. DEMOS, FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLOrNrY 70-72 (1970). One of the
most plausible rationales why the parents engaged in "putting out" their children was
that they did not trust themselves with their own children and were afraid the chil-
dren would be spoiled if they gave them too much affection. E. MORGAN, THE PuRI-
TAN FAMILY 77 (2d ed. 1966).
37. Huard, supra note 3, at 747.
38. Yet the practice of "putting out" was not universal throughout the colonies.
Grevn, Family Structures in the Seventeenth Century Andover, 23 WM. & MARY Q.
234 (3d ser. 1966).
39. MORGAN, supra note 36, at 78. Morgan also relates that both the colonies
of Massachusetts and Connecticut had provisions for the death penalty "for a rebel-
lious son and for any child who should smite or curse his parents."
40. DEMOS, supra note 36, at 73.
41. Presser, supra note 3, at 457. Demos cites a situation involving four orphans
where it is apparent that seventeenth century Americans did consider the best interest
of the child as the central purpose of adoption. Here, the orphans' father died and
the mother subsequently married. Then, the mother pre-deceased the orphans' step-
father. The step-father, before he remarried, saw that the children were taken care
of. DEMOS, supra note 36, at 122.
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to guarantee the quality of the child's upbringing. 42
The custom of "binding out" was used for orphans who had no rela-
tives. 43  In this situation, orphans were placed in homes to work. The
emphasis was on the benefits that accrued to the adults from the child
labor.44 Subsequently, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, protec-
tive legislation was enacted for the care and training of orphan apprentices
and indentured servants. If the requirements of the legislation were not
met, the state had the power to remove the orphans from their masters. 45
By the middle of the nineteenth century, a growing concern for the
"best interest" of the child could be seen. One English visitor remarked
in 1848:
One blessed custom they have in America resulting from the abundance
which they enjoy: a man dies, his widow and children are objects of
peculiar care to the surviving branches of his family, the mother dies-
her orphans find a home among her friends and relatives. 46
However, with the advent of industrialism and massive immigration, "put-
ting out," "apprenticeship" and "'binding out" became economically im-
practicable. The practice of placing orphans with relatives became inap-
propriate, particularly for the urban masses, since facilities often were
economically incapable of supporting an additional member. Thus, in the
middle of the nineteenth century, new means for child welfare became nec-
essary. A reform movement resulted in the institution of adoption.
In the 1840's and '50's, American adoption statutes were private
acts. 47 The purposes of these private acts varied, ranging from the chang-
ing of names so that the adopted child could sue and be sued or grant
and receive an estate in the new name, 48 to enabling the adopted child
42. The following illustrates the role of religion:
Widow Mary Ring who died in 1631 left her young son Andrew to grow
up in the family of her son-in-law Stephen Deane-requiring Deane "to
help him forward in the knowledge and feare of God, not to oppresse him
by any burdens but to tender him as he will answere to God."
Id. at 122.
43. Presser, supra note 3, at 458.
44. A. CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY 171-72 (1917).
45. Id. at 308.
46. Id. at 23. But see M. KORNITZER, CHILD ADOPTION IN THE MODERN
WORLD 347 (1952), where it is pointed out that later in the century, parents adver-
tised children for adoption, or gave them away. Also, children's societies placed
thousands of uninvestigated children in uninvestigated homes.
47. See, e.g., Ky. Acts, 1841, at 163, N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1844, at 46; Ga. Laws,
1852, at 499; Wisc. Gen. Acts., 1855, at 14.
48. See, e.g., Pennsylvania statute, Pub. L.N. 212, 1844 entitled: "An Act to
change the names of certain persons therein named," which provided:
Be it enacted . . . that Eliza Jane Jarvis, of Allegheny county, the daughter
[Vol. 24: 100
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-to inherit from the adoptive parents as a natural child.49 Vidal v. Comma-
gere' ° is the leading case interpreting private adoption acts and empha-
sizing the rights of the adopted child. Briefly, this case involved an 1837
statute which authorized the adoption of a seven-year-old child, and pro-
vided that the adoption be evidenced before, and executed by, a notary
within six months after the enactment of -the statute. The adoptive par-
ents complied with the provisions and the notary declared that the adop-
tee should have "the same rights, and advantages and prerogatives, as if
she had been the issue of the marriage of the parties to the act." 5' Sub-
sequently, the adoptive father died and collateral heirs brought suit con-
tending that the adopted child acquired no right by the above-mentioned
act, and, therefore, did not have an interest in the father's estate. The
court rejected the argument and concluded that the legislature did intend
to confer some substantial right by passing this private act.5 2 Moreover,
,the court relied on Webster's Dictionary for the meaning of the term
of Oliver J. Jarvis, and now the adopted child of James and Hannah Miles,
shall henceforth be called and known by the name of Eliza Jane Miles, and
by this name to be capable of suing and being sued, and of granting or tak-
ing any estate in the same manner she could have done if no change had
been made therein.
49. An example of an act which provided for the changing of the adopted child's
name as well as entitling him or her to the same rights as if natural-born is an Illi-
nois provision enacted in 1853. The Act provided:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the people of the state of Illinois, repre-
sented in the General Assembly, That the name of Marshall Myrick, of the
county of Jersey, the adopted son of Jonathan E. Cooper of said county,
be changed to that of Marshall Myrick Cooper.
Section 2. That the said Marshall Myrick Cooper shall be and he is
hereby declared to be entitled to all the rights that would belong or pertain
to him were he the natural son of the said Jonathan E. Cooper.
Section 3. This act to take effect and be in force from and after its pas-
sage.
Ill. Laws, 1853, at 485. A subsequent Pennsylvania statute, Pub. L. No. 100, passed
in 1855, exemplifies the purpose of adopting a child as a lawful heir:
Be it enacted . .. that it shall be lawful for John H. Bugher and Rebecca
Bugher to adopt, in pursuance of their petition to the legislature, as and for
their child and heir at law, Rachel Clark, now living with them at Fayette
city, by the name of Emily Bugher, and the said child shall hereafter be
known by the latter name, and have capacity to take and inherit from said
petitioners real and personal estate in manner as if she were their lawful
child: Provided, that said petitioners shall further present their petition to
the court of common pleas of Fayette County, consenting to such adoption
and capacity to inherit by said child, and said court shall by its decree ap-
prove of the same.
50. 13 La. Ann. 516-17 (1858). It should be noted, however, that Louisiana in-
corporated civil law adoption practice, especially a Spanish statute which was re-
pealed in 1808.
51. Id. at 519.
52. Id. at 517.
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"adoption," and concluded that the legislature's use of "adoption" in
Vidal's notorial act meant the same as its dictionary definition, and its
meaning under a Spanish statute. 53 The court emphasized the right of
the adopted child and awarded her the succession. By the middle of the
nineteenth century, most state legislatures had enacted general adoption
statutes and therefore did not need to rely on case law and private acts.5 4
In 1846, Mississippi enacted the first general adoption statute55 which
enabled a stranger to the adoptor's blood to become an heir of that adop-
tor.56 Texas and Vermont followed in 1850. 57 Massachusetts passed the
first comprehensive adoption statute in 1851.58 Key provisions of the act,
which emphasized greater supervision of the adopter-adoptee relationship,
included the following requirements: (1) That the natural parents or le-
gal guardian give written consent; (2) that the child, if fourteen or older,
himself consent; (3) that the spouse of the adoptor (if married) join in
the petition for adoption; (4) that the probate judge be satisfied that the
petitioner(s) be "of sufficient ability to bring up the child ...and that it is
fit and proper that such adoption should take effect"; (5) that once the
probate court approves, the adopted child becomes "for all intents and pur-
poses" the legal child of the petitioner(s); (6) that the decree of adoption
deprive the natural parents of all legal rights and obligations respecting
the adopted child; and (7) that any petitioner or child who is the subject
of such a petition might appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court from the
decree of the probate judge. 9 According to one contemporary source, the
purpose of the Massachusetts act, as well as the other acts passed over
the next quarter century (which for the most part were direct copies of
the Massachusetts law),60 was to secure for the adopted child a proper
share in the estate of the adopting parents in the event the parents died
intestate.6 1
These early adoption statutes have been classified into two broad
53. Id. at 517-19.
54. See H. WITMER, et al., INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 28 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as WITMER].
55. McFarlane, The Mississippi Law on Adoptions, 10 Miss. L.J. 239, 240
(1938).
56. Id.
57. Presser, supra note 3, at 465 n.106.
58. Huard, supra note 3, at 748. There is some controversy as to whether Mas-
sachusetts or Mississippi can claim the first adoption statute. Huard believes that,
though Mississippi may have been first, the Massachusetts law was "more complete."
59. Mass. Acts of 1851, ch. 324.
60. Kuhlman, supra note 34, at 225.
61. H. WHITMORE, THE LAW OF ADOPTION iii-iv (1876).
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types. 'The first type did not make any express provision for public super-
vision of the adoption agreement or its effect on the welfare of the child.
Rather, these statutes, which included those of Texas, Vermont, Tennessee
and Mississippi, were authentications and public records of private adop-
tion agreements.6 2, The second class of acts provided for judicial super-
vision over adoption. 63 Included in this second class was the Illinois adop-
tion act of 1873-74.64 Under this statute, a resident of Illinois had to pe-
tition the circuit or county court where the individual resided for leave to
adopt a child as well as to change the child's name to his own.65  After
the petition for adoption"6 was submitted, certain requirements had to be
satisfied before the court would enter a decree, i.e., the natural parents'
desertion of the child at least one year prior to the adoption application,
and the court's satisfaction that the adoptive parents were sufficiently able
to bring up the child in an atmosphere that included suitable nutrition and
education.67 Under that act, as now, any child fourteen or older had to
consent in order for the adoption to be valid.68  Moreover, once adopted
the child was treated for inheritance purposes as a natural child, with the
exception that he was incapable of receiving property specifically devised
to bodily heirs of the adoptive parents. 69
II. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS-Focus ON ILLINOIS
In tracing the evolution of adoption, this Comment has shown how
adoption affected the natural parents, the adoptors, the person adopted, and
the community. Depending on the, time frame or civilization involved, one
of these parties was given priority over the other. The law of many early
civilizations, such as Rome, ,emphasized the right of the adoptor. Al-
though many Englishmen were sensitive to the need for perpetuating the
family line through adopted heirs, this sensitivity was not strong enough
to overcome the English notion that heirs should be of the blood, made
62. WlTMER, supra note 54, at 30.
63. Id.
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 1-8 (1874).
65. Id. § 1.
66. The following was required by statute to be included in the petition for adop-
tion:
1. Name, sex, and age of the adopted child;
2. The new name of the child, if desired;
3. Name and residence of the natural parents, if known to the petitioner
and whether they consent to such adoption.
Id. at § 2.
67. Id. § 3.
68. -ld. § 4; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-12 (1973).
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 5 (1874).
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by God, not by man.70 Also, adoption was not introduced into the com-
mon law because of the child-rearing practices, "putting out" and "appren-
ticeship," which appeared to provide adequately for child welfare. When
adoption moved across the Atlantic to America, the new statutes exhibited
a radical departure from the basic premise of Roman law, since the welfare
of the adopted rather than the continuity of the adoptor's family became
the primary concern of American laws. As a result of this concern, the
"best interests of the child" formula arose in state adoption laws.
Illinois has, by statute, espoused a policy of serving the best interests
of the child. To aid in analyzing the extent to which the state is serving the
"best interests of the child," the following sections of this Comment exam-
ine the present Illinois adoption procedures. There are three general stages
of adoption regulation: (1) the pre-adoption stage, when it is determined
that an adoption may take place; (2) the actual proceeding, which in-
cludes the investigation of -the adoptive parents and adherence to racial
and religious criteria; and (3) the stage following the initial adoption de-
cree.
A. Pre-Adoption
In Illinois, as in every state, it is believed that a child's best interest
is served by being with the natural parents. 71 Because of this belief in
the bond between child and natural parents, the state places primary im-
portance on the consent of the parents in any adoption proceeding. An
adoption that takes place without informed, knowledgeable consent will
be void.72 The courts require strict proof of consent, to prevent the tragedy
of a child who has formed emotional attachments to the adoptive parents
being returned to natural parents who did not consent to the adoption.73
Until recently, Illinois law required only the consent of the mother
in the adoption of an illegitimate child.74 The Illinois courts upheld this
priniciple for several years, 75 but in 1972 the United States Supreme Court
70. Presser, supra note 3, at 514.
71. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 348 Il. App. 1, 107 N.E.2d 622 (1952).
72. In Petition of Lewis v. LoChiro, 350 Ill. App. 394, 112 N.E.2d 917 (1953),
the court held that a mother who had surrendered her child to an adoption agency
without informing her husband had not given proper consent since the father must
consent or no adoption could occur.
73. In re Perl, 38 Il. App. 2d 430, 187 N.E.2d 303 (1962). To consent, a parent
must physically appear before the proper authorities and give his or her consent to
the adoption. The fact that a parent would consent if found is not sufficient. Hook
v. Wright, 329 Ill. 299, 160 N.E. 579 (1928); Keal v. Rhydderck, 317 Il1. 231, 148
N.E. 53 (1925).
74. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4 § 9.1-8 (1971).
75. Jambrone v. David, 16 Ill. 2d 32, 156 N.E.2d 569 (1959); In re Simaner,
16 Il1. App. 2d 48, 147 N.E.2d 419 (1958).
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ruled in Stanley v. Illinois76 that the interest of the father of an illegitimate
child was no different than the interest of the mother, so that his consent
was also necessary in an adoption proceeding. 77
The natural parents, however, are not the only persons who must con-
sent to the adoption. The consent of both adopting parents is also a vital
prerequisite before any adoption can occur. If a wife were not joined by
her husband in the adoption petition, the court would not grant the
76. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
77. Changes in Illinois adoption law were occasioned by Stanley. In Slawek v.
Covenant Children's Home, 52 Ill. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972), the Illinois Su-
preme Court held unconstitutional those portions of the Illinois Adoption and Pa-
ternity Acts which conflicted with Stanley. In accordance with this decision, a cri-
tical paragraph from section 9.1-8, which provided the procedure for consents, has
now been deleted.
Other sections of the Act have also been added or amended to properly reflect
Stanley, the most critical of which is 9.1-1E. Under this section, the father of an
illegitimate child is now considered to be and accorded the rights of a "parent." But
section 9.1-1D, which sets forth the grounds for a finding of parental unfitness, was
amended by the addition of two more grounds:
(k) Failure to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern or re-
sponsibility as to the welfare of a new born child during the first 30 days
after its birth.
(1) Failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were
the basis for the removal of the child from his parents or to make reason-
able progress toward the return of the child to his parents within twenty-
four months after an adjudication of neglect under Section 2-4 of the Juve-
nile Court Act.
Other more procedural changes are as follows: section 9.1-12a providing for notice
to the putative father is totally new. Such notice may be "upon written request" by
any "interested party" to "any clerk of any circuit court," and may be by personal
service, or certified mail. Unless the father responds appropriately, he loses his
rights to the child and waives notice of any further proceedings. If he is not the
father he may file a disclaimer of paternity which is noted by the clerk.
Section 9.1-10 provides the forms for consent and surrender for born and unborn
children. All consent forms provide for the consenting parents general appearance
and waiver of service, and explicitly advise the signor that the document, with one
exception, is irrevocable.
Under section 9.1-9, the general rule of irrevocability is excepted to for fathers,
who may revoke for any reason before the expiration of 72 hours after birth of the
child. Consents and surrenders are otherwise irrevocable except when there is a
showing of fraud or duress.
After Stanley putative fathers can be omitted as defendants if they have been
served with notice under section 9.1-12a and have filed a disclaimer of paternity, or
failed to file the same for request for notice under that section.
Under the 1973 amendments, even persons whose rights have been terminated un-
der section 9.1-12a must be named as parties. Defendants who cannot be personally
served with process are to be served by publication by the circuit court clerk. Gen-
erally no names appear on this notice. Defendants over fourteen years of age, in-
cluding the person sought to be adopted, may waive service by filing a general ap-
pearance. See also Hession, Adoptions after Stanley-Rights for Fathers of Illegiti-
mate Children, ILL. B.J. 350 (Mar. 1973).
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request, as there must be proof that both adoptive parents wish to have
the child.78  The agency to which a child is given must also consent to
the adoption. ,If the child's parents are not living, the guardian of the
child must consent to the adoption. Where no guardian exists, the court
will appoint one 79 who is to protect the best interests of the child during
the adoption proceeding. 80  Consent is usually not required from relatives
or godparents of the child unless they can show that they have been act-
ing in the capacity of parents. Standing in loco parentis has been tradi-
tionally defined as contributing money toward food, shelter, and clothing
for the child. 81
Illinois law states that parental consent to an adoption is irrevocable
unless such consent were obtained through fraud or duress.82 The parents
must be informed of its irrevocability, and when so informed, later
change of heart will not defeat an adoption decree. 83 When the biological
parents assert that there has been fraud or duress, the burden of proof
rests on 'the party claiming the fraud.8 4 'Fraud will be found when the
parent or parents were misinformed, or not given enough information to
make an informed consent.8 5 Duress will be found if the consent were
obtained by taking advantage of a weakened condition of a parent.8 6 Be-
cause the mother is often in a weakened emotional and physical state im-
mediately after giving birth, no consent may be given for seventy-two
78. Watts v. Dull, 184 Ill. 186, 56 N.E. 303 (1900); Ashlock v. Ashlock, 360
Ill. 115, 195 N.E. 657 (1935).
79. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (1973).
80. In Cook County, Melvin Parnell is designated as the guardian for all children
to be adopted. It is debatable whether he is able to look after the best interest of
each child.
81. See People ex rel. Smilga, 345 Il. App. 365, 103 N.E.2d 378 (1952), where
the petitioner cared for the child for seven years, and was the child's godmother.
Upon their arrival in the United States the child was placed for adoption. The court,
in denying petitioners claim that her consent to the adoption was necessary, held that
she had not provided the child with enough financial support to stand in loco parentis.
82. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-11 (1973).
83. Cohen v. Janic, 57 Ill. App. 2d 309, 207 N.E.2d 189 (1965); People ex rel.
Filipkowski v. Gusterine, 16 Ill. App. 2d 336, 148 N.E.2d 1 (1958); Nelson v. Nel-
son, 127 Ill. App. 422 (1907).
84. Shlensky v. Shlensky, 396 Ill. 179 (1947); In re Balota, 7 111. App. 2d 178,
155 N.E. 2d 104 (1959).
85. People ex rel. Karr v. Weike, 30 Ill. App. 2d 361, 174 N.E.2d 897 (1961).
The mother believed she had a year in which to decide whether or not to keep the
child. The agency representative knew of her belief and made no attempt to correct
it.
86. People ex rel. Buell v. Bell, 20 Ill. App. 2d 82, 155 N.E.2d 104 (1959). In
this case the mother gave consent while under the influence of a sedative, and no
explanation was given as to the irrevocability of the consent,
19741 THE ILLINOIS ADOPTION ACT 113
hours.8 7 This requirement gives the parents time to reflect on their situa-
tion, to avoid a hasty decision.
While some decisions in the past allowed parents to withdraw their
consent prior to a final decree of adoption,88 the trend today is in the op-
posite direction. 9 It seems clear that in the absence of fraud, the courts
will not allow parents to withdraw their consent. Such action is based on
the belief that new attachments will be formed in the adoptive home and
removal from that home may have harmful effects upon the child. 90
When dealing with consent, the final person to be considered is often
the child. In Illinois, if the child is fourteen or older, his or her consent
will be necessary for -the adoption to occurY1 If, however, the child is
under the age of fourteen, the courts need not inquire as to the wishes
of the child. 92 It is felt that a child under fourteen is not able to determine
what is best for himself or herself. Thus, a child under fourteen may have
no voice in the disposition of the case.
To summarize 'the area of consent, it can be generally stated that con-
sent of the natural parents or guardian is always necessary, as is consent
of the adoptive parents. In addition, the adoption agency must consent,
and if there is someone standing in loco parentis, the consent of this person
may, at times, also be necessary. Last, parental consent is final unless
there has been fraud or duress, and a child under fourteen need not be
consulted. 93
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-9 (1973). For the exception with regard to
fathers, see note 77 supra.
88. In re Thompson v. Bums, 333 Ill. App. 354, 86 N.E.2d 155 (1949); Petition
of Dickholtz, 341 Ill. App. 400, 94 N.E.2d 89 (1950).
89. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-11 (1973).
90. Giacopelli v. Crittenton Home, 16 111. 2d 556, 566 (1959). The court stated:
"We cannot uproot the child from an adoptive home full of love, care, and opportu-
nity for the sole and only purpose of placing him with his natural parents."
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-12 (1973).
92. In Cook County, the judge will always ask the child his or her preferences
in a contested adoption. Interview with Judge Helen F. McGillicuddy, Associate
Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County, in Chicago, Oct. 10, 1973 [hereinafter cited as
McGillicuddy Interview].
93. On the other hand, perhaps the ability to overlook the required consents was
established long ago. In the apparently forgotten case of Baker v. Strahom, 33 Ill.
App. 59 (1889), an adoption was permitted without the required consent of the di-
vorced father, and without a declaration that he was unfit. After the divorce of the
parents, the mother became ill and consented to an adoption by the grandparents.
The natural father objected to the adoption, claiming it could not go forward without
his consent. The court disagreed, stating, at 60: "The welfare of the child is an
important element in a proceeding of this character. The natural rights of the par-
ents are not to be disregarded, but nothing is to be yielded to mere caprice or ob-
stinacy, or to opposition prompted by any unworthy motives." The adoption was
granted,
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The only instance in which a state will allow a child to be taken from
his or her natural parents without their consent and adopted by new pa-
rents is when the natural parents are found unfit. As stated above, the
child's best interest is normally held to be with the natural parents.94
However, in those cases in which the parents are judged unfit, the best
interests of the child will dictate removal from their care and custody. As
long as they are fit, biological parents are held to have a right to 'their
children; the courts will not find parental unfitness unless the evidence is
conclusive. In Petition of Dickholtz, the majority opinion emphasized this
point with the following statement:
Unless the proof is clear that the natural parents are unfit to have the
care, custody and control of the child, the contest for control of the child's
future between persons having no vested interest in the child . . . as
against the natural law which binds a mother to her child, should be
resolved in favor of the mother. 95
In order to obtain a finding of parental unfitness, one of the following
must be proven: depravity, cruelty, habitual drunkenness, open adultery
or fornication, desertion, or abandonment. 96 Depravity and open adultery
or fornication will be treated together, since a finding of open adultery
will also constitute a finding of depravity. Depravity may be defined as
an inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude. 9 7 This has been con-
strued to mean a severe deviation from established societal behavior, and
not just one departure from the norm.1'8 Furthermore, this severe devia-
tion must be in utter disregard of normal moral behavior, and it must be
shown that a child raised in such an atmosphere would be adversely af-
fected. Conviction of a crime in most instances will not brand a parent
a depraved person. 99 The party asserting depravity always bears the bur-
94. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 348 Ill. App. 1, 107 N.E.2d 622 (1952).
95. Petition of Dickholtz, 341 Ill. App. 400, 90 N.E.2d 89 (1950).
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1D (1973).
97. Jackson v. Russell, 342 I11. App. 637, 97 N.E.2d 584 (1951).
98. See Oeth v. Erwin, 6 Ill. App. 2d 18, 126 N.E.2d 526 (1955), where it
was held that a child born out of wedlock does not brand the mother a depraved
person. In Stalder v. Stone, 412 Ill. 488, 107 N.E.2d 696, 701 (1952), Justice Max-
well writing for the majority found that:
where the affair resulting in the birth of the child is but one of a series,
conducted both before and after the birth, with different persons, some of
whom were known to be already married, and where abortion and perjury
are resorted to without moral trepidation, then it can properly be found that
there is an inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude constituting the
depravity of character contemplated by the state.
99. In Young v. Prather, 120 Ill. App. 2d 395, 256 N.E.2d 670 (1970), a convic-
tion for burglary was not enough to warrant a finding of depravity. In Smith v. An-
drews, 54 Ill. App. 2d 51, 203 N.E.2d 160 (1964), a conviction for forcible rape
did result in a finding of depravity.
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den of proof, since the Illinois courts favor the natural parents. 100
To prove a parent unfit due to drunkenness, it must be shown that
,the drunkenness has existed for a period of one year prior to the adoption
petition.101 A parent in a state of habitual drunkenness cannot effectively
be a parent and will be held unfit. 10 2  Cruelty to one's child may also
be grounds for unfitness. 10 3  The degree of cruelty necessary to warrant
a finding of unfitness, however, is not entirely clear.'0 4 A parent may
exert force upon his or her child if the force is reasonable and intended
to maintain discipline. A parent who goes beyond the bounds of reason-
ableness and interferes with the physical well-being of a child will, in many
cases, be found unfit.
Parental desertion or abandonment accounts for most of the instances
of termination of parental rights. Desertion will be found when the child
is deserted for three months prior to 'the adoption petition. 105  An
important test in this regard is whether or not the parent has mainiained
a reasonable degree of interest in the child. A parent who is ill or is kept
away from his or her child will not be guilty of desertion. 10 6
Failure to support is not always considered a sign of desertion. The
courts will, additionally, look closely at the amount of time spent with the
child as well as financial support, in order to determine their decision.' 07
100. Thorpe v. Thorpe, 48 Ill. App. 2d 455, 198 N.E.2d 743 (1964).
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1D(j) (1973).
102. Habitual drunkenness has been defined as: "the involuntary tendency to be-
come intoxicated, which is required by frequent repetition, such frequent indulgence
to excess as to show a formed habit and inability to control the appetite." Garrett
v. Garrett, 252 Ill. 318, 326 (1911).
103. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1D(e) (1973).
104. Cruelty which would be unlawful under the criminal statutes is not always
enough to find the parent unfit. See generally Terr & Watson, The Battered Child
Rebrutalized: Ten Cases of Medical-Legal Confusion, 124 AMER. J. PSYCH. 1432
(1968).
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1D(f) (1973). See In re Walpole, 5 Ill. App.
2d 362, 125 N.E.2d 639 (1955), in which the court held that:
Only clear and convincing proof of such conduct on the part of a parent,
that shows unmistakably that the parent is relinquishing his parental duties
and claims, or willfully throwing the child upon the world, without regard
or consideration to his or her responsibilities or obligations, will justify a
court in holding that parent unfit.
Id. at 369, 125 N.E.2d at 645.
106. Hill v. Allabaugh, 333 Ill. App. 602, 78 N.E.2d 127 (1948) (the father be-
came ill while out of state, no desertion found); In re Walpole, 5 Ill. App. 2d 362,
125 N.E.2d 639 (1955) (the mother refused to allow the father to visit his child,
there could be no desertion).
107. In Carson v. Oberling, 73 Ill. App. 2d 412, 218 N.E.2d 820 (1966), the
father failed to meet support payments, but visited his children regularly. The court
1 974]
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The courts will then carefully examine the length of time of the alleged
desertion. If it finds that the parent exercised any parental duties within
three months of the date of the petition for adoption, desertion will not
be found. 108 If a parent deserts his or her child for a period longer than
three months, but subsequently resumes some parental duties, the courts
will not allow a finding of unfitness.
Unlike desertion, abondonment has no three month time limit. A-
bandonment is evidenced by conduct on the part of -the parent which shows
a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish claims to the
child. 10 9 In one case, a mother who moved to another state with no inten-
,tion of returning to see her son was found to have abandoned him.' 10 In
abandonment, therefore, it is the intent of the parent, rather than the
length of the desertion, that is important.
B. The Adoption Proceeding
Once consent to the adoption or unfitness of the parents has been
established, there are certain procedures required in 'Illinois to insure that
the best interests of the child will be served. One such requirement is
,that the parents or guardian of the child sought to be adopted be notified
of the proceeding."' Thus, if they have not consented or been adjudged
unfit, they may oppose the adoption." 2 This precludes the adoption from
being granted until controversies are resolved. Hence, a child will be
spared -the pain of having formed new emotional attachments only to be
returned later to the natural parents, because of proof that the natural pa-
rents were not notified.
Section 9.1-6 of the Illinois Adoption Act 1 3 requires that the court,
within ten days after the filing of a petition for adoption, appoint an
agency or other competent person to investigate fully the allegations in the
petition, and determine whether the adoptive parents are fit and proper
persons to raise the child. Such investigation of the adoptive parents is
designed to insure that the child will be put in a home with all the advan-
tages of a normal family relationship. This investigation will not be re-
refused to find desertion. In Houston v. Brackett, 38 Ill. App. 2d 463, 187 N.E.2d
545 (1963), the father failed to support the children, and only visited them four times
in two years. The court found this to be desertion.
108. Smith v. Cirvello, 338 Ill. App. 503, 88 N.E.2d 107 (1949). The father
had only seen his children three times in one year, but his last visit had been just
one month before the adoption petition. The court could not grant the request for
adoption.
109. People ex rel. Bowdry v. Bowdry, 324 I11. App. 52, 57 N.E.2d 287 (1944).
110. In re Miller, 15 Ill. App. 2d 333, 146 N.E.2d 226 (1957).
111. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-7 (1973).
112. People v. Sullivan, 224 II1. 468, 79 N.E. 695 (1906).
113. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-6 (1973).
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quired, however, when the adoptive parents are related to the child.' 14
Another procedure to be followed in Illinois is stated in section 9.1-
15 of the Adoption Act, which requires that "the court in entering a decree
of adoption shall, whenever possible, give custody through adoption to a
petitioner or petitioners of the same religious belief as that of the child."",,
At the time this section was passed into law, it was felt that it was in the
best interest of a child to remain with the religion of the natural parents
whenever possible.116 The Illinois courts definitely take the religion of
the prospective parents into consideration, but this does not forbid the
placement of a child with parents of a different religion.117 Thus, a dif-
ference in religion in and of itself will not deny adoption -to otherwise qual-
ified parents.
There is a paucity of cases and laws concerning transracial adoption
in Illinois, but according to Fountaine v. Fountaine,"l s race alone cannot
be decisive in a custody or adoption proceeding. Transracial adoption
does occur in Illinois, but on a small scale. There is some debate concern-
ing the desirability of transracial adoption, but foster home care and insti-
tutional care are regarded as poor alternatives for the child."19  While
there are no laws in Illinois concerning transracial adoption, agencies do
not encourage it.' 20 The Illinois courts, however, may not deny adoption
using race as the sole criterion.' 2'
The final element involved in 'the adoption proceeding stage is the
discretion given the judge in determining the best interests of the child.
As previously stated, 'the courts will seldom, if ever, find that it is in the
114. Id. It should be noted that this Comment does not deal with adoption
agency regulations, but only with legal requirements.
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-15 (1973).
116. Both the Catholic and Jewish faiths consider it a breach of religious law
to allow a child born into either of those religions to be placed in a family of a differ-
ent religion. Interview with Richard Mandell and Nicholas Stevenson, Chicago
adoption lawyers, in Chicago, Oct. 8, 1973.
117. In Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill. 2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957), the majority
held that:
In each instance the court has the discretion to determine primarily whether
the child's best interests are served by the adoption, and identity of religion
between the child and the adoptive parents is a significant and desirable but
not an exclusive factor to be considered by the court in the exercise of this
discretion.
id. at 276, 140 N.E.2d at 299.
118. 9 Ill. App. 2d 482, 133 N.E.2d 532 (1956).
119. See generally James, Race as a Consideration in Adoption and Custody Pro-
ceedings, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 256.
120. id.
121. Fountaine v. Fountaine, 9 I11. App. 2d 482, 133 N.E.2d 532 (1956).
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best interest of a child to be taken from the natural parents, unless there
has been a showing of their unfitness. This is generally followed, although
it may mean removing 'the child from the only home he or she has ever
known.122 There are, however, factors which may influence a court to
deviate from the normal pattern and find tha-t the best interests of the child
outweigh the interests of the natural parents. The length of time the child
has been away from the natural parents is an important factor. In cases
in which the child has lived several years with the adoptive parents, the
court will be reluctant to give the natural parents custody again. 123  The
rationale for this is that the child might be severely damaged by such a
forced change of environment. In addition to the length of time the child
has been with the adoptive parents and away from the natural parents,
the court will also look at the age, sex, and stability of the child. 124
The financial ability of the contesting parties may be an additional
factor considered by the court. However, it is usually given little weight
if it is considered at all. 125 Courts often will not favorably receive an argu-
ment that one party is in a better financial situation to care for the child.
To do so would discriminate against the poor, 126 as well as allow bidding
for the child. In any case, the trial judge may have to make a personal
determination as to the best interests of the child. Hopefully, such deter-
minations are made in actual fairness to the child.
C. Post Adoption
The last stage in the adoptive process-the post adoption stage--deals
with procedures after the initial decree of adoption has been issued. At
this stage, the adoptive parents have had the child for at least six
months. 127  After this time period, they may apply for a decree of
adoption and the court, having had the time to view the results of the
agency investigation, will render a decision. This period between the ini-
tial decree and the final decree gives -the new parents a chance to demon-
strate further their fitness to raise the child. It allows for additional in-
vestigation, if necessary, and gives the child time 'to acquaint himself or
herself to the new surroundings. Once the final decree is issued, the adop-
122. People ex rel. Smilga, 345 111. App. 365, 103 N.E.2d 378 (1952). See expla-
nation in text accompanying note 81 supra.
123. People v. Weeks, 228 Ill. App. 262 (1923).
124. Id.
125. McGillicuddy interview, supra note 92.
126. Hill v. Allabaugh, 333 Ill. App. 602, 78 N.E.2d 127 (1948).
127. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-14 (1973).
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tion is complete and the adopted child will have the rights and duties equal
to that of a natural child.1 28
Illinois law further provides for confidentiality of the records of the
adoption 29 and of the agency report on the adoptive parents. It is believed
that it is in the best interests of the adopted child not to know who his or
her natural parents are. This provision also protects the adoptive parents
and the child from the natural parents who may wish to take the child back
at some future time. Indeed, the records are so confidential that a child
may not learn of his or her natural parents without a court order. Once
the adoption is complete, the child receives a new birth certificate 8 0 and
all ties with the natural parents are severed.' 81
Finally, the courts will not overturn a valid adoption decree unless
there has been a clear violation of the law during the proceeding. Courts
will not overturn on technicalities.'8 2  Thus, if there has been substantial
compliance with the statute, the adoption will stand. 13
III. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
In order to make laws that will serve "the best interests of the child"
lawmakers might turn to the behavioral sciences for guidance. However,
empirical research offers little that can be regarded as conclusive standards
for the unique situation of adoption." 4 There is, of course, a wealth of lit-
erature on the development of the child,"35 but such information has little
bearing on adoption decisions. A key factor in this dilemma is the diffi-
culty of doing controlled research in cases where there are custodial alterna-
tives, i.e., in cases where there are custody fights or where there are dif-
ferent sets of parents desiring to care for the child.
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4 (1973).
129. Id. § 9.1-18.
130. Id. § 9.1-19.
131. Id. § 9.1-17.
132. Petition of Wojtkowiak, 14 Ill. App. 2d 344, 144 N.E.2d 760 (1957).
133. Petition of Stem, 2 111. App. 2d 311, 120 N.E.2d 62 (1954).
134. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREuD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD (1973); Ripple, A Follow-Up Study of Adopted Children, 42 Soc. SER.
REV. 479 (1968). This portion of the Comment is based solely upon research that is
expressly empirical, and has either ignored or but superficially considered theoretical
works that did not exhibit any empirical justification. The reason for this approach
is the author's theoretical bias.
135. See generally E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1963); P. MussEN, J.
CONGER, & J. KAGAN, CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONALITY (1963); Thomas et al.,
Individuality in Responses of Children to Similar Environmental Situations, 117 AM.
J. PSYCH. 798 (1961).
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In custody fights, there are such diverse circumstances that rigorous
controls are unattainable. For example, if a one-year-old child who has
been living for five months with adoptive parents is reclaimed by the nat-
ural parents, the adjudicator must decide which set of parents should be
granted custody. Such a real-life decision means consideration of numer-
ous elements, a situation quite different from the theoretical one involving
a single element, such as whether children of alcoholics are worse off than
children of non-alcoholics. It is not a simple matter of determining wheth-
er the child should be placed with the "more fit" parent.
To begin with, there is the problem of balancing the relative fitnesses
of the opposing claimants. Further, these situations are complicated by
the risks of separating the child from parent figures and the risks of the
adoption process itself. 13 6 For instance, while it may appear that the nat-
ural parents are more fit, the child may suffer because of separation
from the adoptive parents. On the other hand, if it is the adoptive parents
who are considered more fit, then the child will be left with the problems
that appear to be inherent in the adoption process.137 Furthermore, it is
not simply a matter of determining whether it is preferable for a child to
be with parents of a particular age, class, religion, or temperament, but
136. There is a wealth of literature on the deleterious effects of maternal depri-
vation and parental separation, as well as on the effects of the adoption process. The
information on parental separation is not directly applicable to the problems of adop-
tion because these studies generally deal with the effects of hospitalization and pa-
rental death. However, these studies are suggestive. 'For parental separation see,
e.g., M. Ainsworth et al., The Effects of Maternal Deprivation: A Review of Find-
ings and Controversy in the Context of Research Strategy, in DEPRIVATION OF MA-
TERNAL CARE, PUBLIC HEALTH PAPERs No. 14, Geneva: World Health Organization
97 (1962); J. BOWLBY, MATERNAL CARE AND MENTAL HEALTH, MONOGRAPH SERIES
No. 2, Geneva: World Health Organization (1951); Bowlby, The Nature of the
Child's Tie to His Mother, 39 INT'L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 350 (1958); Bowlby, Separa-
tion Anxiety: A Critical Review of the Literature, I J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCH. 251
(1960); Bowlby et al., The Effects of Mother-Child Separation: A Follow-Up Study,
29 BRmSH J. MED. PSYCHOL. 211 (1956); Humphrey et al., Adoptive Families Re-
ferred for Psychiatric Advice, 110 BrISH J. PSYCH. 549 (1964); Mead, A Cultural
Anthropologistes Approach to Maternal Deprivation, in DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL
CARE, PUBLIC HEALTH PAPER No. 14, Geneva: World Health Organization 45
(1962); Schaffer, Objective Observations on Pesonality Development in Early In-
fancy, 31 BRITISH J. MED. PSYCHOL. 174 (1958); Spitz, Hospitalism, 1 PSYCHOANAL.
STUDY OF THE CHILD 53 (1945); Spitz, Anaclitic Depression, 2 PSYCHOANAL. STUDY
OF THE CHILD 313 (1946). On the effects of adoption, see, e.g., Bohman, A Com-
parative Study of Adopted Children, Foster Children and Children in Their Biologi-
cal Environment Born After Undesired Pregnancies, 221 SUPPLEMENT ACrA PAEDIA-
TRICA SCANDINAVIA 1 (1971); Jackson, Unsuccessful Adoptions: A Study of 40 Cases
Who Attended a Child Guidance Clinic, 41 BRITISH J. MED. PSYCHOL. 389 (1968);
Mikawa & Boston, Psychological Characteristics of Adopted Children, 42 Supp.
PSYCH. Q. 274 (1968).
137. See Bohman; Jackson; Mikawa & Boston; supra note 136.
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one of comparing these attributes in two or more distinct sets of parents.'8 8
Clearcut answers are rare. The judge is often faced with balancing the
harm or the benefit that would seem to follow from placement with either
set of parents. 'It is obvious that rigorous controls cannot be devised in
order to arrive at firm standards for placement. 'However, some of the
findings and difficulties of the behavioral sciences may aid in determining
"the best interest of ,the child."'189
It may appear to the layperson that a child adopted in infancy is like
any other child; yet there are indications, as discussed later, that such an
attitude is naive. It may be noted on an intuitive level that the adopted
child suffers from a two-tiered problem: emotional reactions to both the
natural and the adoptive parents. In the first instance, the child feels re-
jection by -the natural parents, regardless of the wisdom or altruism of their
decision to release their child. For example, the child may try to accept
the fact that the unmarried mother was unable to provide care, and there-
fore gave the child -to the adoptive parents for the "good" of the child.
Yet the evidence of other unmarried mothers keeping their children
would serve to underscore the child's sense of abandonment. For
whatever reasons the parents relinquished the child, there are similarly sit-
uated parents who have kept their children. Even in cases of death or
institutionalization of the parent, the child may experience feelings of re-
jection. 40
In the second instance, the child may feel that he or she is a second
choice for 'the adoptive parents. This emotion is felt because, in most in-
stances, the reason for the decision to adopt is reproductive difficulty.14 '
138. For example, if it were determined that, other things being equal, a child
fares better with parents who are not economically deprived, then it would be easy
to award the child to the contesting parents who are financially secure. Yet, if it
is shown that it is preferable for a child to be accepted by his or her natural parefits,
rather than to be "rejected" (as the child might view the decision), then it would
be simpler to leave the child with the natural parents. While researchers have not
stated that a particular socioeconomic level has necessary consequences, some effects
have been suggested. For a review of the literature, see Ziv & Luz, Manifest Anxiety
in Children in Different Socioeconomic Levels, 15 HUMAN DEy. 224 (1973).
139. It would be particularly useful to the legal profession for the behavioral scien-
tists to deliberately join the effort in devising standards to determine the best interests
of the child, rather than to have the legal profession tread into territory for which
it is untrained. Such an attempt was made by GOLDSTEIN, FREUD, & SOLNIT, supra
note 134. However, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD explains little of the
empirical or clinical facts on which the guidelines are based. The lawyer then can rely
only on the authors' reputations, a source which places an evaluation more in the
realm of faith than science.
140. That children view death as a rejection of the child by the deceased is a
common psychoanalytic interpretation. See, e.g., id. at 12.
141. It is common knowledge, or a common assumption, that infertile people are
more likely to adopt than are the fertile. See, e.g., Kirk, Dilemna of Adoptive Par-
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Therefore, adoption is a second choice, second to the choice of procreation.
Research suggests that adopted children may face special additional
obstacles because of attitudes of the adopting parents. It is not uncommon
for adoptive parents to blame -the child's behavioral problems on hered-
ity. 142 Such an attitude on the part of the parents could easily place stress
on the parent-child relationship, emphasizing 'the separateness of the
adopted child, i.e., emphasizing the fact that the child is not a natural child
of the adoptors-that -the child does not belong with the adopting
family. 143
The psychiatric literature suggests that adopted children are more
prone to emotional disturbances than are non-adopted children. The first
such study was published by Marshall Schecter, M.D. His conclusions
have stimulated much research and rebuttal. In his study Schecter observes
that adopted children are thirteen times more likely to be referred to
psychiatrists than are non-adopted children. 1 44 More conservative re-
searchers reduce the relative incidence of phychiatric disturbance among
the adopted; the lowest reported rate is that the adopted are almost twice
as likely to ,be found in psychiatric settings. 145
enthood: Incongruous Role Obligations, 21 MARRIAGE & FAMILY LIVING 316 (1959);
Kadushin, Study of Adoptive Parents of Hard-to-Place Children, 43 SOCIAL CASE-
WORK 227 (1962). Concern over the population explosion may lead some people
to seek adoption rather than procreation.
142. Schecter et al., Emotional Problems of the Adoptee, 10 ARCHIVES OF GEN.
PSYCH. 109 (1964); Walsh & Lewis, Study of Adoptive Mothers in a Child Guidance
Clinic, 50 SOCIAL CASEWORx 587 (1969).
143. See D. KIRK, SHARED FATE: A THEORY OF ADOPTION AND MENTAL HEALTH
(1964). Kirk deals with the problem that both adoptor and adoptee try to believe
that they are like a natural, biological family, when in fact they know they are not.
144. Schecter, Observations on Adopted Children, 3 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCH.
21 (1960).
145. Goodman et al., Adopted Children Brought to Child Psychiatric Clinic, 9
ARcmvEs OF GEN. PSYCH. 451 (1963). Goodman criticizes Schecter's original study
because it did not control for geography and income. Since it is primarily the middle
and upper classes who legally adopt, it is to be expected that adopted children would
be over-represented in a psychiatrist's private practice, since it is precisely those groups
who are more likely to utilize psychiatrists. Goodman found that 1.7% of the popu-
lation was extrafamilially adopted, that is, adopted by nonrelatives. At the Staten
Island Health Center, from 1956 through 1962, 2.4% of the patients were extra-
familially adopted. While Goodman believes that this difference is significant, it is
less alarming than other studies show. Id. at 459. Other studies of the incidence
of adopted children found in psychiatric settings include Bohman, A Comparativc
Study of Adopted Children, Foster Children and Children in Their Biological Envi-
ronment Born After Undesired Pregnancies, 221 SUPPLEMENT AcrA PAEDIATRA SCAN-
DINAVIA 1 (1971); Humphrey et aL, Adoptive Families Referred for Psychiatric Ad-
vice, 109 BRIuTISH J. PSYCH. 599 (1963); Jackson, Unsuccessful Adoptions: A Study
of 40 Cases Who Attended a Child Guidance Clinic, 41 BRITISH J. MED. PSYCHOL.
389 (1968); Jameson, Psychiatric Disorders in Adopted Children in Texas, 63
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There is some evidence that the ability to avoid emotional dis-
disturbances varies with -the age of placement and with the type of place-
ment. It appears that children adopted after the age of six months are
more likely later to evidence psychiatric disturbances, but such findings
are not conclusive. 146  In fact, one contradictory study shows that children
adopted after the age of six years fared no worse than those adopted in
infancy. 147 What is particularly striking about this study is that the older
children had been placed in several foster homes prior to adoption.' 48
Independent placement is done by persons not associated with an adop-
tion agency, usually physicians and attorneys. This type of placement
seems to cause more problems for the child than does placement by an
agency, but the evidence offered is tentative and conflicting. 149  It seems
reasonable to expect that parents who were found unqualified by an
agency but who subsequently adopted through independent channels
would be a greater risk to the adopted child and a possible cause of dis-
turbance.
It is generally unquestioned that institutionalization should be a last
resort-that even poor parenting is preferable to institutional parenting.150
TEXAS MED. 83 (Apr. 1967); Kirk et al., Are Adopted Children Especially Vulner-
able to Stress? A Critique of Some Recent Assertions, 14 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCH.
291 (1966); Lawton & Gross, Review of Psychiatric Literature on Adopted Children,
110 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCit. 635 (1964); Mikawa & Boston, Psychological Charac-
teristics of Adopted Children, 42 SupP. PSYCH. Q. 274 (1968); Offord et al., Present-
ing Symptomatology of Adopted Children, 20 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCH. 110 (1969);
Schecter et al., Emotional Problems of the Adoptee, 10 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCH.
109 (1964); Simon et al., Adoption and Psychiatric Illness, 122 SupP. AM. J. PSYCH.
858 (1966); Work & Anderson, Studies in Adoption: Requests for Psychiatric Treat-
ment, 127 AM. J. PSYCH. 948 (1971). These researchers generally give a much
higher percentage of adopted children in psychiatric settings than does Goodman, but
the figures are also lower than Schecter's original 13.3%.
146. Bell, Special Considerations in the Adoption of the Older Child, 40 SOCIAL
CASEWORK 327 (1959); Brieland, Current Research on Adoption, 30 Soc. SER. REV.
247 (1956); Humphrey et al., Adoptive Families Referred for Psychiatric Advice, 109
BRuTISH J. PSYCH. 549 (1964); Offord et al., Presenting Symptomatology of Adopted
Children, 20 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCH. 110 (1969); Ripple, A Follow-Up Study of
Adopted Children, 42 SOCIAL SERVICE REv. 479 (1968); Schaffer, Objective Observa-
tions of Personality Development in Early Infancy, 31 BRITISH J. MED. PSYCHOL. 174
(1958).
147. Kadushin, A Follow-Up Study of Children Adopted When Older: Criteria
of Success, 37 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 530 (1967).
148. Id. at 532. The number of such foster home placements averaged 2.3. In
all cases, court action had terminated parental rights.
149. Jameson, Psychiatric Disorder in Adopted Children in Texas, 63 TEXAS
MED. 83 (Apr. 1967); Schecter et al., Emotional Problems of the Adoptee, 10 AR-
CHIVES OF GEN. PSYCH. 109 (1964).
150. Brieland, Current Research on Adoption, 30 Soc. SERv. REV. 247 (1956);
Spitz, Hospitalism, 1 PSYCHOANAL. STUDY OF THE CHILD 53 (1945). The desirability
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However, a surprising degree of resiliency has been found in some chil-
dren who have experienced institutionalization and severe parental depri-
vation.' At the same time, there does appear to be a critical period of
residence in an institution during which the juvenile inmates are most sus-
ceptible to psychopathology. 152  It cannot -be said, however, that severe
deprivation, whether caused by institutionalization, foster care, or poor pa-
renting, commonly causes psychopathy or affectionless behavior.' 58
The psychiatric and social science literature dealing indirectly with
parental unfitness, viz., child abuse, has emphasized prevention, treat-
ment, and crisis intervention; but it has not evolved concrete standards for
termination of parental rights.' 54 This is to be expected, since the invol-
untary termination of parental rights is considered 'to be a drastic measure.
That the Illinois Adoption Act requires natural parents to consent to
the ,termination of their parental rights' 55 and adoptive parents to agree
to the adoption seems so reasonable as not to require any supporting data.
It would be unthinkable to give a child to unconsenting parents or to ter-
minate parental rights without cause and without consent. While it is ob-
vious that the consent of the adoptive parents is in the best interests of
the child and the adoptive parents, it can also be seen -that the consent
of the natural parents is not necessarily in the best interests of the child.
American law reflects the American belief that parents have certain invio-
lable rights in their children.' 56 The best interest of the parent is the basic
of any system of parenting depends upon the qualities that are desired in a particular
culture. Multiple mothering or institutional parenting is not per se unhealthy. B.
BETTLEHEIM, CHILDREN OF THE DREAM (1969); Mead, A Cultural Anthropologist's
Approach to Maternal Deprivation, in DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL CARE, PUBLIC
HEALTH PAPER No. 14, Geneva: World Health Organization 45 (1962).
151. Bowlby et al., The Effects of Mother-Child Separation: A Follow-Up Study,
29 BRITISH J. MED. PSYCHOL. 211 (1956); Williams, Some Effects of institutional
Living on Personality Development, 28 J. MAR. & FAM. 331 (1966).
152. Williams, supra note 151.
153. Bowlby, supra note 151.
154. This can be seen by a check of the citations in SOCIAL SCIENCE AND HUMAN-
ITIES INDEX AND INDEX MEDICUS for the last ten years.
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (1973).
156. id. It can be inferred that the adoption statute is based on this belief. The
value that parents have certain rights over their children can be observed by any par-
ticipant in this society. For an analysis of the relationship of basic cultural postu-
lates to law, see generally E.A. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1954).
While some courts view themselves as champions of children's rights, other more
realistic courts have recognized their limitations. In In re Schwab's Adoption, 355
Pa. 534, 540, 50 A.2d 504, 508 (1947), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a
much criticized decision, held that "the welfare of the child is weighed only after
the necessary consents have already been given or forfeited." An Illinois case has
interpreted the Illinois act similarly: In In re Petition to Adopt Cech, 8 Ill. App.
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premise. To remove a child from the custody of a fit natural parent with-
out the parent's consent violates that faith. Additionally, this consent re-
quirement offers some protection to both the adoptive parents and the
adopted child: it minimizes the possibility that the natural parent will later
attempt to regain the custody of the child. Under the Illinois Adoption
Aot, the consent of the child need not be taken into account unless the
child is over the age of fourteen. 15 7 This may seem a harsh rule when
the child is old enough to appreciate the proceedings, but on .the other
hand, it can be seen as a terrible burden on a child of young years to
have to decide whom he or she will have as a parent. The potential for
regret and guilt is great.
The statutory requirement that the adoption records be kept confi-
dential may or may not be in the best interests of the child. This con-
fidentiality may be considered a violation of the child's civil rights, partic-
ularly at the time of the child's majority. It may be argued that the child
has a right to such genealogical information. On the other hand, this con-
fidentiality may be seen as a necessary measure to protect the adoptee
from unpleasant facts. It may be better to "let sleeping dogs lie" than,
for example, to expose the adoptee to the fact that his or her biological
relatives were criminals or insane. However, it is difficult to characterize
a measure as protective when those who are to be "protected" do not nec-
essarily want the protection. It does appear that confidentiality serves
the best interests of the adoptive parents, who will not be threatened by
the prospect of the child learning about and perhaps loving his or her nat-
ural parents. That the records be kept concealed from the world at large,
including the adoptive and natural parents, does seem to protect the child
from unwelcome interference by either set of parents. The adoptive
3d 642, 291 N.E.2d 21 (1972), the court stated:
[Section 9.1-15 of the Adoption Act] contains the legislative declaration
that the welfare of the child shall be the prime consideration in all adoption
proceedings .... Nevertheless, this declaration does not mean that absent
consent or unfitness, adoption can be granted solely upon the basis of the
best interest of the child .... The welfare of the child may be the decisive
criterion in awarding custody in divorce and separate maintenance cases but
it is not the sole dictate of the result in adoption proceedings. Adoption,
unlike mere custody, severs conclusively the rights and interest of the nat-
ural parents. . . . These rights should not be terminated unless a clear
and convincing case has been made in strict compliance with the adoption
statute. . . . The nature of adoption necessitates an appraisal of the ef-
fect not only upon the child but also upon the natural parent.
Id. at 645, 291 N.E.2d at 23-24.
157. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-12 (1973). Judge McGillicuddy has explained
that the consent or wishes of the child are often considered when the child is old
enough to understand the proceedings. McGillicuddy interview, supra note 92.
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parents are then unable to find evidence to blame the child for his or her
heredity, and the natural parents are unable to contact the child.
The basic premise that has been accepted by the state is that, barring
unusual circumstances, the child's best interest is served by having the
child remain with his or her natural parents. 158 It is easy to see that this
premise is a necessary one: in ordinary circumstances, the state feels in-
competent ;to change the biological order absent compelling reasons that
such a change will, with a reasonable degree of certainty, affect a desired
result. Given the absence of professional consensus about what will or
will not have a particular effect in these circumstances, and absent any
consensus about what is or is not "desirable," any unnecessary interference
'by the state can be seen to be equivocal. It is "safer" to leave nature
alone. Responsibility is thus avoided. Whether the American cultural
postulate that children should be raised by their bioligical parents is valid
at present is irrelevant. The postulate exists; it is deeply ingrained; it is
safe; and no superior, acceptable alternative commands wide support
in this country. Thus, little meaning can be put into the policy of
protecting the "best interests of the child." It could even -be questioned
whether the state prefers the best interests of the child over the best inter-
ests of the parents, inasmuch as lawmakers identify more with parents than
with children. It does appear that lawmakers (and others) want to be
known as champions of children. But owing to the nebulous nature of the
"best interests of the child," the strength of this "commitment" to children
cannot be gauged.
Craig Benson
Christine Godsil Cooper
Joel Handler
Ralph Walters
158. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1 et seq. (1973).
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